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REVIEW OF STEGANALYSIS OF DIGITAL IMAGES 
by 
Xinlei Pan 
Steganography is the science and art of embedding hidden messages into cover multimedia 
such as text, image, audio and video. Steganalysis is the counterpart of steganography, 
which wants to identify if there is data hidden inside a digital medium. In this study, some 
specific steganographic schemes such as HUGO and LSB are studied and the steganalytic 
schemes developed to steganalyze the hidden message are studied. Furthermore, some new 
approaches such as deep learning and game theory, which have seldom been utilized in 
steganalysis before, are studied. In the rest of thesis study some steganalytic schemes using 
textural features including the LDP and LTP have been implemented. 
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The objective of this thesis is to study and classify methods in steganalysis and to try show 
some improvement in steganalysis. 
Steganalysis is the study of detecting whether a suspected document has a payload 
encoded in it; in other words, steganalysis is the counter part of steganography. 
Steganography is the science and art of hiding secret messages into innocuous looking 
cover documents, such as speeches and images. Each steganographic communication 
system consists of data embedding part and the hidden date extraction part.  
A lot of steganographic schemes are freely available today on the internet such as 
J-Stego [1], EzStego [2], MB [5], OutGuess [40], F5 [4] etc. Most of these steganographic 
methods modify the redundant bits in a carrier to hide secret messages. This doing however 
changes the statistical properties of the cover medium as creating a stego medium. There 
are two most popular methods used for steganography: spatial domain embedding and 
transform domain embedding. 
Likely, steganalysis also can be classified in two types: specific and universal. The 
specific type focus on the particular steganographic algorithm and this type has a high 
success rate for detecting the presence of secret messages. The universal steganalysis 
algorithms are designed to be operatable all known and unknown steganography algorithms.  
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Universal steganalysis can be considered as a two-class pattern classification 
problem to classify the test images as a cover or a stego image. Generally, the classification 
consists of two procedures, the feature extraction and the pattern classification. Generally, 
a set of feature is a representation of an image with much lower dimensionality and is 
crucial for many pattern recognition problems, including steganalysis. The effective 
features for steganalysis should extract information about the changes incurred by data 
hiding rather and compress the content of the image. 
It has been about 15 years since the research on steganalysis has been developed. 
As a specific steganalysis algorithm, the Raw Quick Pair (RQP) was proposed by Fridrich 
et al. [7] in 1999. This method is based on analyzing the close colors by LSB embedding 
[6]. Because the number of close colors in an image with embedded code is obviously 
larger than it with a normal image. Hence, this algorithm works very well as long as the 
number of close colors in the cover image is less than 30% of the number of pixels. 
In 2001, Fridrich et al. [8] also claimed a new Specific Steganalysis called Regular 
and Singular group (RS Steganalysis) for detecting (least significant bit) LSB non-
sequential embedding. The image is divided into disjointed groups of fixed shapes. Each 
group noise is measured by the mean absolute value of the differences between adjacent 
pixels. Those groups will be classified as regular or singular depending on whether the 
pixel noise is increased when using a ‘mask’. When data are embedded into an image using 
LSB method, one can analysis the regular and singular groups. 
As the universal method, Li et al. [9] designed a feature extraction method 
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containing two parts. One is generated from the coefficient co-occurrence matrices which 
was proposed by Kodovsky et al. [18] in 2011, while another part is derived from the co-
occurrence matrices of coefficient differences. They trained those features by sub-
classifiers which are integrated by an ensemble classifier with a Bayesian mechanism [25]. 
In this way, the performance is improved by 2%. 
Fridrich et al. [10] introduced a spatial-domain steganalytic method (Rich Model) 
for detecting common steganography. The rich model is assembled by submodel, which is 
based on its detection error: the out-of-bag error calculated from the training set. They 
estimate the detection accuracy by observing the difference between how different 
submodels engage in detection. 
Shi et al. [3] had shown that textural features are a very helpful choice for 
steganalysis for Highly Undetectable Steganography (HUGO) in 2012 [19]. They learned 
and utilized the textural features from rich literature in the field of texture classification for 
further development of modern steganalysis. They use the local binary pattern as the 
textural feature framework with a group of textural feature masks, including Markov 
neighborhoods [30], cliques [3] and Laws’ masks [30]. 
It is clearly that steganalysis is making progress. In recent years, game theory [11] 
and deep learning [17], which have never used before, are involved into steganalysis now. 
Tomáš et al. [11] introduced a powerful steganalytic method in the detection of content 
adaptive LSB Matching [26] with a gaming theory in 2014. They focused on the modern 
steganographic embedding paradigm based on minimizing an additive distortion function. 
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The strategies of both players are comprised of the probabilistic selection channel. In this 
paper, they demonstrate the example of a two-pixel cover that the Nash equilibrium that 
minimizes the KL divergence between cover and stego objects. 
Qian et al. [17] demonstrated that deep learning can be used in steganalysis in 2015. 
They proposed a new paradigm to learn features automatically via customized 
Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN) [28], which has never been used in steganalysis 
before. What’s more, the guidance of classification can be used during the feature 
extraction step. Even though the accuracy in HUGO cannot be higher than Spatial Rich 
Model (SRM), this technique still achieves comparable performances. 
In this thesis, an attempt has been made to make a note of various approaches 
proposed for steganalysis of digital images and the classification of them. The rest of the 
paper is organized as follows. Chapter 2 shows six classic steganalytic techniques, while 
Chapter 3 presents the newest approaches in steganalysis; In Chapter 4, we propose an 
improved method for Shi et al. [3], by replacing the local binary pattern (LBP) with the 
Local Derivative Patter (LDP) [12] and LTP [13]. Summary and conclusions drawn from 




1.2 Overview of Steganography 
1.2.1 General Concepts 
The Internet offers great convenience in transmitting large amounts of data to different 
parts of the world. However, the safety and security of long distance communication 
remains an issue. This problem has led to the development of steganography schemes. 
Steganography is an ancient idea of hiding information. If it works well, the message does 
not attract attention from eavesdroppers and attackers. 
 
 
Figure 1.1 Framework of steganography. 
 
Figure 1.1 shows how steganography operates over Cover Medium and the 
Embedded Message which may be text, or any other type of data, with a Stego Key which 
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1.3 Modern Techniques of Steganography 
Steganography is the science and art of hiding information. Steganography techniques can 
be defined into four categories: Physical steganography, Digital steganography, Network 
steganography and Printed steganography. In this thesis, we mainly talk about Image 
steganography. Image files like Bit Map Picture (MBP), Portable Network Graphics (PNG), 
Joint Picture Expert Group (JPEG) and etc. are used to hide data.  
 
1.3.1 LSB Embedding Algorithm 
The most widely used technique to hide secret data at the early stage is the Least 
Significant Bit (LSB) [13], which is an Image Domain technique. This method uses the 
least significant bits of early pixels in a digital image. When using a 24 bit color image, 
bits of red, green and blue color component can be used; in this way more secret bits can 
be embedded. 
Another category of image steganography techniques is transform domain 
techniques. Transform domain techniques encode secret messages in its transform areas of 
cover images which makes those messages more robust to attacks such as compression and 
cropping. The Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT) [29] domain is widely used in Transform 
Domain techniques, e.g. JPEG images used the DCT for compression. A JPEG encoder 
partitions an image into many 8 × 8  blocks. Each block is converted to frequency 
coefficients by using two-dimensional DCT. However many of the 8 × 8 coefficients are 
equal to zero, and it will have an effect on the compression rate if we change too many 
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zeros to non-zero values. It is the reason that the number of bits one could embed in to the 
DCT domain is less than the number by using LSB method. 
 
1.3.2 F5 Algorithm 
The F5 steganographic algorithm was introduced by Andreas Westfeld [4]. The goal of 
their research was to develop a practical embedding method for JPEG images that would 
provide high steganographic capacity without sacrificing security. Guided by their 𝜒2 
attack, they challenged the paradigm of replacing bits of information in the cover-image 
with the secret message while proposed a different paradigm of incrementing image 
components to embed message bits. 
Instead of replacing the LSBs of quantized DCT coefficients with the message bits, 
the absolute value of the coefficient is decreased by one. The authors argued that this type 
of embedding cannot be detected by using the 𝜒2 statistical attack. 
 
 
Figure 1.2 Permutative embedding scatters the changes (×). 
 
Source: Andreas Westfeld, “F5—A Steganographic Algorithm High Capacity Despite Better Steganalysis,” 




The straddling mechanism used with F5 shuffles all coefficients using a 
permutation firstly. Then, F5 embeds data into the permuted sequence. The transformation 
does not change the number of coefficients. The permutation depends on a password. F5 
delivers the steganographically changed coefficients in the original sequence to the 
Huffman coder. With the correct key, the receiver is able to repeat the permutation. The 
permutation has linear time complexity 𝑂(𝑛). Figure 1.2 shows the uniformly distributed 
changes over the whole image. 
The embedding process starts with a seed for a PRNG from the user password and 
generating a random walk through the DCT coefficients of the cover image. The PRNG is 
also used to encrypt the value 𝑘 using a stream cipher and embed it in a regular manner 
together with the message length in the beginning of the message stream. The body of the 
message is embedded using matrix embedding, inserting 𝑘 message bits into one group 
of 2𝑘– 1 coefficients by decrementing the absolute value of at most one coefficient from 
each group by one. 
The embedding process consists of the following six steps: 
1. Get the RGB representation of the input image. 
2. Calculate the quantization table corresponding to quality factor Q and compress 
the image while storing the quantized DCT coefficients. 




ℎ(0) − ℎ(1) + 0.49ℎ(1), where ℎ𝐷𝐶𝑇 is the number of all DCT coefficients, 
ℎ(0) is the number of AC DCT coefficients equal to zero. 
4. The user-specified password is used to generate a seed for a PRNG that 
determines the random walk for embedding the message bits. 
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5. The message is divided into segments of k bits that are embedded into a group 
of 2𝑘– 1 coefficients along the random walk. 
The following example shows what happened with the Matrix Encoding. If we want 
to embed two bits 𝑥1, 𝑥2 in three modifiable bit places 𝑎1, 𝑎2, 𝑎3 changing one place at 
most. Here are all of the four cases: 
 
            𝑥1 = 𝑎1⊕𝑎3, 𝑥1 = 𝑎2⊕𝑎3 ⇒ 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑛𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔 
𝑥1 ≠ 𝑎1⊕𝑎3, 𝑥1 = 𝑎2⊕𝑎3 ⇒ 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑎1 
𝑥1 = 𝑎1⊕𝑎3, 𝑥1 ≠ 𝑎2⊕𝑎3 ⇒ 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑎2 
𝑥1 ≠ 𝑎1⊕𝑎3, 𝑥1 ≠ 𝑎2⊕𝑎3 ⇒ 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑎3 
 
where ⊕ presents XOR operation. In general, we have a code word a with n modifiable 
bit places for 𝑘 secret message bits 𝑥. Let 𝑓 be a hash function that extracts 𝑘 bits from 
a code word. Matrix encoding enables us to find a suitable modified code word 𝑎 for 
every 𝑎 and 𝑥 with 𝑥 =  𝑓(𝑎′). 
F5 implements matrix encoding only for 𝑑𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 1. For (1, 𝑛, 𝑘), the code words 





















⋅ 𝑙𝑑(𝑛 + 1) =
𝑘
2𝑘 − 1
  (1.2) 
 












The embedding efficiency of the (1, 𝑛, 𝑘) code is always larger than 𝑘. 
 
1.3.3 HUGO Embedding Algorithm 
Pevný et al. [19] presented the highly-undetectable steganography (HUGO) for digital 
media, which learned from the technique, known as steganalysis technique, known as 
SPAM [27]. Because SPAM uses further higher statistics, however, it leads to high 
dimensionality, which is hard to possess for steganalysis.  
The main design process is to minimize a suitably-defined distortion by means of 
efficient coding algorithm. The distortion is defined as a weighted difference of extended 
state-of-the-art feature vectors already used in steganalysis. This allows them to ‘preserve’ 
the model used by steganalysis and thus be undetectable even for large payloads. What’s 
more, the high dimensional model is necessary to avoid known security weaknesses which 
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is acceptable in this technique.  
As same as SPAM, HUGO algorithm uses second order Markov Process. 
 
𝑫𝑖,𝑗⃗⃗⃗⃗ = 𝑰𝑖,𝑗 + 𝑰𝑖,𝑗+1  (1.4) 
 
where 𝐷 is the difference array, which is for horizontal left to right, 𝐼 is an image.  
 
𝑴𝑑1,𝑑2⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ = Pr (𝑫𝑖,𝑗+1⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗ = 𝑑1, 𝑫𝑖,𝑗⃗⃗⃗⃗ = 𝑑2)  (1.5) 
 
And the second-order Markov process is used, 
 
𝑴𝑑1,𝑑2,𝑑3⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗ = Pr (𝑫𝑖,𝑗+2⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗ = 𝑑1|𝑫𝑖,𝑗+1⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗ = 𝑑2, 𝑫𝑖,𝑗⃗⃗⃗⃗ = 𝑑3)  (1.6) 
 
It is known that, the 2nd order Markov process is equivalent to the 3rd order co-
occurrence, under certain condition, which can be satisfied. 
 







Figure 1.3 shows the individual steps of the HUGO algorithm. 
 
Figure 1.3 High-level diagram of HUGO. 
 
Source: Tomáš Pevný, Tomáš Filler, Patrick Bas, “Using high-dimensional image models to perform highly 
undetectable steganography,” Information Hiding. Springer, Heidelberg, 2010, pp. 161-177. 
 
The accuracy is evaluated by examine the minimal average decision error equal of 





(𝑃𝐹𝑃 + 𝑃𝐹𝑛)  (1.5) 
 
where 𝑃𝐹𝑃  and 𝑃𝐹𝑛  stand for the probability of false alarm and probability of missed 
detection. The additive distortion measure: 
 

















High Dimensional Model 
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In order to stress those parts of the co-occurrence matrices that are more important for 
steganalysis, the Equation 1.7 is defined as a weighted sum of differences. 
 














where 𝑤(𝑑1, 𝑑2, 𝑑3) is a weight function: 
 









where 𝜎, 𝛾 > 0 are parameters that can be tuned in order to minimize the detectability. 
Pevný et al. derived the algorithm to hide the message into the image parts so that 




Figure 1.4 Code of the HUGO embedding algorithm. 
 
Source: Tomáš Pevný, Tomáš Filler, Patrick Bas, “Using high-dimensional image models to perform highly 
undetectable steganography,” Information Hiding. Springer, Heidelberg, 2010, pp. 161-177. 
 
The security of HUGO has been verified and compared to the prior art on a wide 
range of payloads in their experiments. When the fixed classification error 𝑃𝐸 is 40% of 
SVM-based [32] in 2nd-order SPAM, the HUGO increases the secure payload from 0.25 
bpp to 0.4 bpp. In contrast with the LSB matching, when 𝑃𝐸 = 40% on BOWS dataset, 







There are two categories in steganalysis: specific and universal. Specific steganalysis direct 
at particular image features, which are modified by the specific embedding algorithm. A 
steganalysis technique would perform well when tested only on that method and might fail 
on all others. Some specific steganalysis methods are even be able to estimate the length 
of hidden message. Unlike specific steganalysis concerting on a specific steganalysis 
techniques, the universal techniques try to identify the all of steganography algorithms. 
Hence, the general steganalysis methods are more flexible and practical. Universal 
techniques are, however, sometimes cannot detect the targeted embedding algorithms more 
effectively than the specific method designed for breaking the steganographic method. In 
this Chapter, six kinds of classic steganalysis schemes are presented according to their 
publication time. The effective features for steganalysis should be able to catch the changes 
incurred by data hiding. 
 
2.1 Chi-Square Attack 
2.1.1 Concept 
This method is specific to LSB embedding based on powerful first order statistical analysis 
rather than visual inspection. LSB embedding overwrite least significant bits transforms 
values into each other. [1] 
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Figures 2.1 and 2.2 show that the total number of occurrence of two members of 
certain pairs of values (PoV) remains same after message embedding. This concept of pair 
wise dependencies is exploited to design a statistical Chi-square test to detect the hidden 
messages. 
 
Figure 2.1 The color histogram before embedding. 
 
Figure 2.2 The color histogram after embedding. 
 
Source: Andreas Westfeld, Andreas Pfitzmann, “Attacks on steganographic systems, in: Proc. of Information 




A critical point is how to obtain the theoretically expected frequency distribution. 
In the original, the theoretically expected frequency is the arithmetic mean of the two 
frequencies in a PoV. Since swapping one value into another does not change the sum of 
occurrences of both values in each pair, the arithmetic mean of the two frequencies for each 
pair is the same in both cover and stego image. 
 
2.1.2 Implement 
This test performs the following steps: 
A. Supposing there are k categories and we have a random sample of observations. Each 
observation must fall in only one category. Without restricting, we concentrate on the 
odd values of PoVs of the attacked carrier medium. For example, for a palette image 
with 256 color, which means most 128 PoVs and k=128. 
B. The theoretically expected frequency in category 𝑖  after embedding an equally 




|{𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑟|𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 𝑜𝑓 (𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑟) ∈ {2𝑖, 2𝑖 + 1} }|
2
  (2.1) 
 
C. The measured frequency of occurrence in random sample is 
 

















with 𝑘 − 1 degrees of freedom. 
E. 𝑝 is the probability of the statistic with the distributions of 𝑛𝑖  and 𝑛′𝑖  which are 
equal. It is calculated by integration of the density function: 
 
















  (2.4) 
 
 
Figure 2.3 Probability of embedding with EzStego in the flooring tile image. 
 
Source: Andreas Westfeld, Andreas Pfitzmann, “Attacks on steganographic systems, in: Proc. of Information 





The diagram in Figure 2.3 presents the 𝑝-value of the Chi-square test as a function of an 
increasing sample. This p-value is roughly the probability of embedding. Initially, the 
sample comprises 1 % of the pixels, starting from the upper border. For this sample, 𝑝 =
 0.8826. The 𝑝-value increase to 0.9809 when the next sample comprises an additional 2 % 
of the pixels. As long as the sample comprises pixels of the upper half only, in which has 
been embedded, the p-value does not drop below 0.77. The pixels of the lower half of the 
picture are unchanged, because the message to be embedded was not such long. 
 
2.2 Raw Quick Pair 
2.2.1 Introduction 
Fridrich et al. [7] introduced a powerful steganalytic technique that enables us to reliably 
detect the presence of a pseudo-random binary message randomly spread in a color image 
based on analyzing close pairs of colors created by LSB embedding. They estimated the 
probability of both false detections and missing a secret message. 
Writers had observed that the number of unique colors for true-color images is 
significantly smaller than the number of pixels in an image. The ratio of the number of 
unique colors to the number of pixels from 1/2 for high quality scans to 1/6 or even lower 
for JPEG images.  
This observation is very important because it means that many true-color images 
have a relatively small "palette". After LSB embedding, the new color palette will have a 
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very distinct feature. 
 
2.2.2 Encoding 
They proposed to test the presence of messages in true-color images using the 
following idea: 
1. To find out whether or not an image has a secret message in it, calculate the ratio 
R between the number of all pairs of close colors P and the number of all color 








  (2.5) 
 
2. Using LSB embedding in randomly selected pixels (and channels for color M×
N images), embed a test message of the size 𝛼3𝑀𝑁 bits. Smaller values of 𝛼 
will lead to faster techniques. 
 
3. Denoting the corresponding quantities for the new image after embedding the 
test message as 𝑈′ and 𝑃′, and calculate the ratio 𝑅′ for the new image with 







  (2.6) 
 
Obviously, if the secret message size is too small, the two ratios will be very close 
to each other and as a result we will not be able to distinguish images whether embedded 
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with messages or not. 
Fridrich et al. ran the detection algorithm for both databases and tested the message 
presence by embedding a test message of size 𝛼 ≅  1/30. As a result, the values of 𝑅/𝑅′ 
were obtained for both databases. The results are shown in Figure 2.4. If the image has 
already had a large message hidden inside, those two ratios will be almost the same, if the 
image did not steganography it, we expect 𝑅′ > 𝑅. 
The dashed curve corresponds to the database of images with messages and the 
solid curve corresponds to the original database without messages, both after embedding 
the 1kB test message. To separate the two curves, we choose the threshold 𝑇ℎ as 1.1. 
It is difference that enables to distinguish between cover images and stego images 
for the case of LSB steganography. The method works reliably well as long as the number 
of unique colors in the cover image is less than 30% of the number of pixels.  
As reported, the method has higher detection rate than the method given by 
Westfeld [1], which is mentioned at Section 2.1. And it is possible to reliably detect the 
presence of secret message embedded in digital images using the LSB technique. The 
reliability of the detection method increases with decreasing number of unique colors in 
the original image. From the result, they had to notice that some high-quality scans stored 
losslessly may have a very high number of unique colors and the results of the detection 





Figure 2.4 The ratio R'/R for 300 images. The thin dashed curve corresponds to images 
with an embedded message of length equal to 2/3 of the total available number of LSBs 
(3MN). The bold solid curve corresponds to images without any embedded messages.  
 
Source: Jessica Fridrich, Rui Du and Long Meng, “Steganalysis of LSB Encoding in Color Images,” ICME 
2000, New York City, July 31-August 2, New York, USA. 
 
 
2.3 RS Analysis 
A more sophisticated technique Regular and Singular group (RS) steganalysis is presented 
by Fridrich for detection of LSB embedding in color and grayscale images in 2001 [8]. 
This method originated by analyzing the capacity for lossless data embedding in the LSBs. 
 
2.3.1 Implement 
Firstly, the image is divided into disjoint groups of fixed shape. Within each group 
noise is measured by the mean absolute value of the differences between adjacent pixels. 
Each group is classified as regular or singular depending on whether the pixel noise within 
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the group is increased or after flipping the LSBs using a mask. 
Assuming the cover image with 𝑀 ×𝑁 pixels and its pixel values from the set P. 
For example, for an 8-bit grayscale image,  𝑃 =  {0, … , 255} , with 𝑛  adjacent pixels 
 (𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑛).  
To capture the spatial correlation, a discrimination function 𝑓 is defined as the 
mean absolute value of the differences between adjacent pixels. 
 






Then, writers defined an invertible operation 𝐹 on 𝑃 called flipping. Flipping 
will be a permutation of gray levels that entirely consists of 2-cycles. Thus, 𝐹 will have 
the property that 𝐹2  =  𝐼𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦 or 𝐹(𝐹(𝑥))  =  𝑥 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑥 ∈ 𝑃. 
 






𝐹−1 : − 1 ↔  0, 1 ↔  2, 3 ↔  4, … , 253 ↔  254, 255 ↔  256  (2.9) 
 
𝐹0: 𝐹0(𝑥) = 𝑥  (2.10) 
 
the discrimination function 𝑓 and the flipping operation 𝐹 to define three types of pixel 
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groups: 𝑅, S and 𝑈 
 
Regular groups: 𝐺 ∈  𝑅 ⇔  𝑓(𝐹(𝐺))  >  𝑓(𝐺) 
 
Singular groups: 𝐺 ∈  𝑆 ⇔  𝑓(𝐹(𝐺))  <  𝑓(𝐺) 
 
Unusable groups: 𝐺 ∈  𝑈 ⇔  𝑓(𝐹(𝐺))  =  𝑓(𝐺). 
 
From the expressions above, 𝐹(𝐺)  means that the flipping function 𝐹  were 
applied to the components of the vector 𝐺 = (𝑥1, . . . , 𝑥𝑛) 
Fridrich defined the flipped group 𝐹(𝐺) = (𝐹𝑀(1)(𝑥1), 𝐹𝑀(2)(𝑥2), … , 𝐹𝑀(𝑛)(𝑥𝑛)), 
where 𝑀(𝑖), 𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑛 is the element of mask 𝑀 which takes on the values -1, 0 and 
1. The purpose of the flipping 𝐹 is perturbing the pixel values in an invertible way by 
some small amount thus simulating the act of invertible noise adding. 
Since the LSB flipping simulates the act of adding pixel noise, it more frequently 
results in an increase in the value of the discrimination function 𝑓 rahter than a decrease. 
Thus the total number of the regular groups will be larger than that of singular groups. Let 
𝑅𝑀 and 𝑆𝑀 be the realtive number of regular groups and singular groups. the expected 
value of 𝑅𝑀 is equal to that of 𝑅−𝑀, and the same is true for 𝑆𝑀 and 𝑆−𝑀 :  
 




The same for the relationship between 𝑆+𝑀 and 𝑆−𝑀. Randomization of the LSB 
plane forces the difference between RM and SM to zero as the length m of the embedded 
message increases. After flipping the LSB of 50% of pixels, 𝑅𝑀  ≅  𝑆𝑀 can be obtained. 
Here is a simple explanation for the peculiar increase in the difference between 
𝑅−𝑀 and 𝑆−𝑀 for the mask 𝑀 = [0 1 1 0]. Writers defined sets 𝐶𝑖  =  {2𝑖, 2𝑖 + 1}, 𝑖 =
0, … , 127, and cliques of groups 𝐶𝑟𝑠𝑡  =  {𝐺 | 𝐺 ∈ 𝐶𝑟 × 𝐶𝑠 × 𝐶𝑡}. There are 128
3 cliques, 
each clique consisting of 8 groups. Figure 2.5 demostrates 𝑅𝑀, 𝑆𝑀 as functions of the 
number of pixels with flipped LSBs.  
 
 
Figure 2.5 RS-diagram of an image taken by a digital camera. The x-axis is the percentage 
of pixels with flipped LSBs, the yaxis is the relative number of regular and singular groups 
with masks M and −M, M=[0 1 1 0]. 
 
Source: Jessica Fridrich, Miroslav Goljan, Rui Du, “Detecting LSB steganography in color and gray-scale 
images,” IEEE Multimedia Magaz., Special Issue on Security 22–28, 2001. 
The general shape of the four curves in the diagram varies with the cover-image 
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from almost perfectly linear to curved. They had collected experimental evidence that the 
𝑅−𝑀  and 𝑆−𝑀  curves are well modeled with straight lines, while second-degree 
polynomialscan approximate the inner curves 𝑅𝑀 and 𝑆𝑀 reasonably well. 
By flipping the LSBs of all pixels in the image and calculating the number of 𝑅 
and 𝑆  groups, the four points 𝑅𝑀(1 − 𝑝/2), 𝑆𝑀(1 − 𝑝/2), 𝑅−𝑀(1 − 𝑝/2),  and 
𝑆−𝑀(1 − 𝑝/2)can be calculated. The midldle points 𝑅𝑀(1/2)  and 𝑆𝑀(1/2)  will be 
obtained by randomizing the LSB plane of the stego image.  
In this way, Fridrich fitted straight linesthrough the points 𝑅−𝑀(𝑝/2), 𝑅−𝑀(1 −
𝑝/2)  and 𝑆−𝑀(𝑝/2) , 𝑆−𝑀(1 − 𝑝/2). The points 𝑅𝑀(𝑝/2), 𝑅𝑀(1/2), 𝑅𝑀(1 − 𝑝/2) 
and 𝑆𝑀(𝑝/2), 𝑆𝑀(1/2) and 𝑆𝑀(1 − 𝑝/2) determin two parabolas. Each parabola and a 
corresponding line intersect to the left. 
To estimation of the middle points by accepting two more assumptions: 
1. The point of intersection of the curves 𝑅𝑀  and 𝑅−𝑀  has the same 𝑥 
coordinate as the point of intersection for the curves 𝑆𝑀 and 𝑆−𝑀  
2. The curves 𝑅𝑀 and 𝑆𝑀 intersect at 𝑚 = 50%, or 𝑅𝑀(1/2)  =  𝑆𝑀(1/2). 
This assumption is like saying that the lossless embedding capacity for a 
randomized LSB plane is zero. 
Rescaling the x axis so that 𝑝/2 becomes 0 and 100 − 𝑝/2 becomes 1, the x-
coordinate of the intersection point is a root of the following quadratic equation 
 
2(𝑑1 + 𝑑0) 𝑥




where 𝑑0 = 𝑅𝑀(𝑝/2) − 𝑆𝑀(𝑝/2), 𝑑1 = 𝑅𝑀(1 − 𝑝/2) − 𝑆𝑀(1 − 𝑝/2), 𝑑−0 = 𝑅−𝑀(𝑝/
2) − 𝑆−𝑀(𝑝/2) , 𝑑−1 = 𝑅−𝑀(1 − 𝑝/2) − 𝑆−𝑀(1 − 𝑝/2). 
The message lenth 𝑝 from the root 𝑥 whose absolte value is smaller by  
 




Writers used equations above to estimate the size of the secret message which is embedded 
in the stego-image. Under certain assumptions the amount of embedded message could be 
accurately determined if the numbers of regular and singular groups are given. 
The initial non-zero bias could be both positive and negative and it puts a limit on 
the theoretical accuracy of their steganalytic method. Smaller images tend to have higher 
variation in the initial bias because of the smaller number of R and S groups. Generally, 
color images exhibit larger variation in the initial bias than grayscales. 
Writes used a small image with a short message. The test image was a scanned 
color photograph 422 × 296 and the message was a random bit sequence with 375 kb or 
20% of the image full capacity (100% = 3bits per pixel). Since the initial bias is about 2.5% 




Table 2.1  Initial Bias and Estimated Number of Pixels with Flipped LSBs. 
Imgae Red(%) Green(%) Blue(%) 
Cover Image 2.5(0.0) 2.4(0.0) 2.6(0.0) 
Steganos 10.6(9.8) 13.3(9.9) 12.4(9.8) 
S-Tools 13.4(10.2) 11.4(10.2) 10.3(10.2) 
Hide4PGP 12.9(10.0) 13.8(10.1) 13.0(10.0) 
 
Source: Jessica Fridrich, Miroslav Goljan, Rui Du, “Detecting LSB steganography in color and gray-scale 
images,” IEEE Multimedia Magaz., Special Issue on Security 22–28, 2001. 
 
The RS steganalysis is more accurate for messages that are randomly scattered in 
the stegoimage than for messages concentrated in a localized area of the image. To address 
this issue, we can apply the same algorithm to a sliding rectangular region of the image. 
The experimental results obtained by RS steganalysis also provide a new estimate 
on safe size of secret messages embedded using LSB embedding. For high quality images 
from scanners and digital cameras, we estimate that messages requiring less than 0.005 bits 
per pixel are undetectable using RS Steganalysis. Higher bit rates are in the range of 




2.4 Histogram Attack 
2.4.1 Attacking J-Steg 
Yu et al. [14] propsosed a method of detecting secret message and estimating the secret 
message length of bitstreams embedded using J-Steg [1]. Firstly, the histogram of cover 
image is estimated from stego image, based on the model of statistical distribution of 
quantized DCT coefficients. Then the secret message is detected and the secret message 
length is estimated with the estimated cover histogram.  
Let 𝑥 denote an instance of a class of potential carrier media, such as pixel values 
or quantized DCT coefficients of an image. If 𝑥 is treated as an instance of a random 
variable 𝑋, which can be discribed the probability distribution 𝑃𝑋(𝑥) . 
In order to detect whether there is a hidden message embedded or not. The detection 
is to perform a hypothesis test to find out whether the instance x obey the probability 
distribution 𝑃𝑋(𝑥) . In order to get the length of unknown meassage, Yu and Wnag 
calculated the equation 𝑆(𝑚) = 𝑆𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑜 for 𝑚, where 𝑆(𝑚) is the macroscopic quantity, 
𝑆𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑜 is the value of 𝑆 for the stego image under investigation. In general, the function 
𝑆  has several undetermined parameters which can be determined by estimating some 
extreme values of S, such as 𝑆(0). To get 𝑆(0), the principle by four pixels were applied 
to estimate the length of hidden message. 
In the JPEG compression standard, images are divided into 8 × 8 blocks. Each 
block is passed through a Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT) to produce 64 DCT 
coefficients and then the coefficients are quantized according to a quantization table and 
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𝑒−𝜆|𝑥|  (2.14) 
 











  (2.15) 
 
There is a closed form solution for the cumulative density function which makes it 
easy to integrate the model density for individual histogram bins.When taking into account 
amore accurate estimation of the quantization effects, one would find this distribution 
appears to fit DCT coefficients better than the generalized Laplacian/Gaussian. 
Let 𝐻(𝑑) be the histogram of cover image after embedding m pseudorandom bits 
in the LSBs, the histograms 𝐻(𝑑) and ℎ(𝑑) will have relations as follow equations. 
 
𝐻(0)  =  ℎ(0), 𝐻(1)  =  ℎ(1)  (2.16) 
 




𝐻(2𝑖 + 1)  =  ℎ(2𝑖 + 1)  + 𝛼 [ℎ(2𝑖)  −  ℎ(2𝑖 + 1)]  (2.18) 
 
where 𝑖 = ±1, ±2,…, α =
𝑚
2∑ 𝐻(𝑖)𝑖≠0,𝑖≠1
, Let 𝐻𝛼  (𝑖)  =  𝐻(2𝑖)  +  𝐻(2𝑖 + 1). 𝐻𝛼(𝑖)  =
 𝐻(2𝑖)  +  𝐻(2𝑖 + 1) .  
Once the model is fit to the histograms for a stego image, it is used to estimate the 
histogram of the cover image. Let ℎ̂(𝑑) be the estimated histogram of cover image. 
 
ℎ̂(0) = 𝐻(0),  ℎ̂(1) = 𝐻(1)  (2.19) 
 
ℎ̂(0) = 𝐻(0),  ℎ̂(1) = 𝐻(1)  (2.20) 
 
ℎ̂(2𝑖 + 1) = 𝐻𝛼(𝑖)
𝑃(2𝑖 + 1)
𝑃𝛼(𝑖)
  (2.21) 
 




Figure 2.6 shows the original coefficient histogram of an image and the estimated 
histogram after message embedding. The coefficients are all AC coefficients. It can be seen 






Figure 2.6 Comparsion of coefficient histograms between original and stego. 
 
Source: Xiaoyi Yu, Yunhong Wang, Tieniu Tan, “On Estimation of Secret Message Length in JSteg-like 
Steganography,” ICPR 2004. Proceedings of the 17th International Conference on Vol. 4 DOI: 
10.1109/ICPR.2004.1333862 
 
Since Yu, Wang and Tan estimated the histogram of the cover image, the detection 
of hidden message and estimation of hidden message length becomes easy. The detection 
is determined by using the Chi-square test.  





𝑖=±1  with 2
𝑘 − 1  degree of 
freedom. Writers can perform Chi-square test at significance level 𝛼 and 2𝑘 − 1 degree 
of freedom to decide whether a suspect images contains secret message or not. 
By calculating 𝛼 the following equation, which is derived from Equtation 2.19-













∑ (𝐻(2𝑖) − ℎ̂(2𝑖))(ℎ̂(2𝑖) − ℎ̂(2𝑖 + 1))±𝑘𝑖=±1







where 𝑘 is the maximum quantized DCT AC coefficient. Thus the length of unknown 
message can be calculated as 
 
𝑀 = 2𝛼 ∑ 𝐻(𝑖)
𝑖≠0,𝑖≠1
  (2.24) 
 
from the experiment result this estimation is more accurate than Fridrichs cropping method. 
 
2.4.2 Attacking F5 
The F5 steganographic algorithm was introduced by Westfel in 2002 [20]. Fridrich and 
Goljan divided thier attack into two separate parts: 
(1) Finding distinguishing statistical quantities 𝑇 that correlate with the number of 
modified coefficients. 
(2) Determining the baseline values of the statistics 𝑇. 
When anaylzing the changes in the histogram by F5 Algorithm, Let ℎ(𝑑), 𝑑 =
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 0, 1, … be the total number of AC coefficients in the cover-image with absolute value equal 
to d after the image has been compressed inside the F5 algorithm. Set ℎ𝑘𝑙(𝑑) as the total 
number of AC DCT coefficients corresponding the frequency (𝑘, 𝑙),The corresponding 
histogram values for the stego-image will be denoted using the capital letters 𝐻 and 𝐻𝑘,𝑙. 
If there are totally 𝑛  non-zero AC coefficients to be modified during the 
embedding process, the number of relative modification od DCT coefficients would be 




(1 − 𝛽)ℎ𝑘𝑙(𝑑) + 𝛽ℎ𝑘𝑙(𝑑 + 1) 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑑 > 0
ℎ𝑘𝑙(0) + 𝛽ℎ𝑘𝑙(1) 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑑 = 0
  (2.25) 
 
Because the first two values in the histogram (𝑑 = 0 and 𝑑 = 1) experience the 
largest change during embeddin, 𝛽 is the value that minimizes the square error between 
the stego-image histogram 𝐻𝑘𝑙 , and the expected values 𝐻𝑘𝑙(𝑑) calculated from the 
estimated histogram ℎ̂𝑘𝑙: 
 
𝛽𝑘𝑙 = arg𝑚𝑖𝑛[𝐻𝑘𝑙(0) − ℎ̂𝑘𝑙(0) − 𝛽ℎ̂𝑘𝑙(1)]
2










ℎ̂𝑘𝑙(1)[𝐻𝑘𝑙(0) − ℎ̂𝑘𝑙(0)] + [𝐻𝑘𝑙(1) − ℎ̂𝑘𝑙(1)][ℎ̂𝑘𝑙(2) − ℎ̂𝑘𝑙(1)]
ℎ̂𝑘𝑙





where the final value of the parameter 𝛽 is calculated as an average over selected low 
frequency DCT coefficients (𝑘, 𝑙)  ∈ {(1,2), (2,1), (2,2)}. 
According to their experiments, the estimated histogram is quite close to the 
histogram of the original image. We provide a simple heuristic explanation of why the 
method for obtaining the baseline histogram values is indeed plausible.  
 
 
Figure 2.7 Effect of F5 on the histogram of DCT coefficient(2,1). 
 
Source: Jessica Fridrich, Miroslav Goljan, Dorin Hogea, “Steganalysis of JPEG Images: Breaking the F5 





In fact, unless the quality factor of the JPEG compression is too low (e.g., lower 
than 60), the stegoimage produced by F5 is still very close to the cover-image both visually 
and using measures, such as the PSNR. The spatial shift by 4 pixels effectively breaks the 
structure of quantized DCT coefficients and subsequent low-pass filtering helps to reduce 
any spurious frequencies due to discontinuities at block boundaries. Thus, it is not 
surprising that the statistical properties of DCT coefficients are similar to those of the 
cover-image. 
Figure 2.7 shows a typical example of how good the histogram estimate is when 
compared to the histogram of the original image. The graph illustrates the original 
histogram values ℎ21(𝑑) (crosses), histogram values after applying the F5 algorithm with 
maximal possible message, or 𝛽 =  0.5 (stars), and the estimate of the original histogram 
(circles). It is found that the largest change in histogram values occur in the first two 
values(𝑑 = 0 and 𝑑 = 1). 
Once the raltive number of changes 𝛽 has been determined, the stego image can 
be distinguished from the cover image. 
 
2.5 Markov Model 
2.5.1 1st Order Markov Features 
In this thenique, steganalysis is considered as a task of two-class pattern recognition. [21] 
Firstly, Shi et al. choose to work on difference JPEG 2-D arrays formed from the 
magnitudes of JPEG quantized block DCT coefficients. Those four direction difference 
 
37 
JPEG 2-D arrays are used to enhance changes caused by JPEG steganography. Then 
markov process is applied to modeling these arrays. In addition to reduce the computation 
computational, a thresholding technique is developed. 
Denote the JPEG 2-D array generated from a given test image by 𝐹(𝑢, 𝑣), 𝑢 ∈
[1, 𝑆𝑢], 𝑣 ∈ [1, 𝑆𝑣],  where 𝑆𝑢 is the size of the JPEG 2-D array in horizontal direction 
and 𝑆𝑣 in vertical direction. Then, the difference arrays are generated by the following 
formulae: 
 
𝐹ℎ(𝑢, 𝑣) = 𝐹(𝑢, 𝑣) − 𝐹(𝑢 + 1, 𝑣)  (2.28) 
 
𝐹𝑣(𝑢, 𝑣) = 𝐹(𝑢, 𝑣) − 𝐹(𝑢, 𝑣 + 1)  (2.29) 
 
𝐹𝑑(𝑢, 𝑣) = 𝐹(𝑢, 𝑣) − 𝐹(𝑢 + 1, 𝑣 + 1)  (2.30) 
 









Figure 2.8 The generation of four difference JPEG 2-D arrays. 
 
Source: Yun Q. Shi, Chunhua Chen, Wen Chen, “A Markov Process Based Approach to Effective Attacking 




Most of the difference values are close to zero. As their experimental works 
reported, an image set consisting of 7560 JPEG images with quality factors ranging from 
70 to 90 is used. The arithmetic average of the histograms of the horizontal difference JPEG 
2-D arrays generated from this JPEG image set and the histogram of the horizontal 
difference JPEG 2-D array generated from a randomly selected image from the set. 
It is observed that most elements in the horizontal difference JPEG 2-D arrays fall 
into the interval [-T, T] as long as T is large enough. The values of mean and standard 
deviation of percentage number of elements of horizontal difference JPEG 2-D arrays for 
the image set falling into [-T, T] when T = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7} are shown in Table 2.2. 
 
Table 2.2  Mean of Percentage Numbers of Elements of Horizontal Difference JPEG 2-
D Arrays Falling with [-T,T] 
 [-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3] [-4,4]* [-5,5] [-6,6] [-7,7] 
Mean 84.72 88.58 90.66 91.99 92.92 93.60 94.12 
 
Source: Yun Q. Shi, Chunhua Chen, Wen Chen, “A Markov Process Based Approach to Effective Attacking 
JPEG Steganography,” 8th International Workshop, IH 2006, Alexandria, VA, USA, July 10-12, 2006, pp. 
249-264. 
 
Threshold value T means that only those elements in the difference JPEG 2-D 
arrays whose value falls into {−𝑇,−𝑇 + 1, … , −1, 0, 1, … , 𝑇 − 1, 𝑇} will be considered. 
If an element whose value is either larger than 𝑇 or smaller than –𝑇, it will be represented 
by 𝑇 or – 𝑇 correspondingly. This procedure results in a transition probability matrix of 
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dimensionality (2𝑇 + 1) × (2𝑇 + 1). 
In total, since they set T as 4, depending on their experimental works, 4 ×
(2𝑇 + 1) × (2𝑇 + 1) = 324 elements will be calculated. 
The feature construction procedure is summarized in Figure 2.9. 
 
Figure 2.9 The block diagram of the feature formation procedure. 
 
Source: Yun Q. Shi, Chunhua Chen, Wen Chen, “A Markov Process Based Approach to Effective Attacking 
JPEG Steganography,” 8th International Workshop, IH 2006, Alexandria, VA, USA, July 10-12, 2006, pp. 
249-264. 
 
Table 2.3  Performance Comparison 
 bpc Farid’s [37] Shi et al.‘s [38] Fridrich’s [39] 324D‘s 
F5 0.4 63.9 74.3 92.8 96.8 
MB1 0.5 59.4 77.1 84.8 99.1 
 
Source: Yun Q. Shi, Chunhua Chen, Wen Chen, “A Markov Process Based Approach to Effective Attacking 
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As a result, this steganalyzer beated out other competitors by more than 20% at bpc 
0.4 by F5 algrithm and got 99.1% in bpc 0.4 by MB1, all along nobody can achieve so high 
successful rate. 
 
2.5.2 Prediciton-Error in Non-JPEG Images 
A steganalysis method based on 2-D Markov chain of thresholded prediction-error 
image is proposed by Zou et al. in 2006 [16] – the same year 324D method was presented. 
The prediction errors are extracted from empirical transition matrices by a threshold 
technique: pixels are predicted by their neighboring pixels and the prediction-error image 
is generated by subtracting the prediction value from the pixel value and then through a 
predefined threshold. 
These features are evaluated with Support Vector Machines (SVM) [32]. SVM with 
both linear and non-linear kernels are used as classifier. The non-linear SVM performs 
much better than linear SVM for proposed higher-dimensional features. It has been 
reported by the author that the results are more effective than Fridrich‘s.  
Zou et al. [15] used neighboring pixels to predict the current pixel. The predictions 
are made in three directions: horizontal, vertical and diagonal since a digital image is 
actually a 2-D array. For each prediction the error can be obtained by subtracting the 




𝑒ℎ(𝑖, 𝑗) = 𝑥(𝑖 + 1, 𝑗) − 𝑥(𝑖, 𝑗)  (2.32) 
 
𝑒𝑣(𝑖, 𝑗) = 𝑥(𝑖, 𝑗 + 1) − 𝑥(𝑖, 𝑗)  (2.33) 
 
𝑒𝑑(𝑖, 𝑗) = 𝑥(𝑖 + 1, 𝑗 + 1) − 𝑥(𝑖, 𝑗)  (2.34) 
 
where 𝑒ℎ(𝑖, 𝑗) indicates the prediction error for pixel (𝑖, 𝑗) along horizontal direction 
while 𝑒𝑣(𝑖, 𝑗) and 𝑒𝑑(𝑖, 𝑗) is the prediction error for pixel (𝑖, 𝑗) on vertical and diagonal 
directions. 
A Markov chain is a random process that undergoes transitions from one state to 
another state space. It is required to possess a property called memoryless: the probability 
distribution of the next state only depends on the current state and not on the sequence of 
events that preceded it. 
A Markov chain is a sequence of random variables 𝑋1, 𝑋2, 𝑋3, … with the Markov 
proper, given the present state, the future and past states are independent. Formally, 
 
𝑃(𝑋𝑛+1 = 𝑥|𝑋1 = 𝑥1, 𝑋1 = 𝑥2, , … , 𝑋𝑛 = 𝑥𝑛, )




A stochastic matrix describes a Markov chain 𝑋𝑡 over a finite state space 𝑆. 
If the probability of moving from 𝑖 to 𝑗 in one time step is 𝑃(𝑗|𝑖) = 𝑃𝑖,𝑗 , the 
stochastic matrix P is given by using 𝑃𝑖,𝑗 as the 𝑖
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This matrix is a right stochastic matrix, so that ∑ 𝑃𝑖,𝑗 = 1𝑗 . 
The probability of transitioning from 𝑖 to 𝑗 in n steps is given by the (𝑖, 𝑗)th 
element of the square of 𝑃 described as: 
 
𝑃 = (𝑃𝑛)𝑖,𝑗  (2.37) 
 
A 2-D Markov chain model is applied to the thresholded prediction error images. 
Figure 2.10-2.12 display the transition model for horizontal, vertical and diagonal 
prediction error an image of size 8 by 8. The arrows represent the changing of state in 






Figure 2.10 Transition model for prediction-error image 𝐸ℎ. 
 
Figure 2.11 Transition model for prediction-error image 𝐸𝑣. 
 
Figure 2.12 Transition model for prediction-error image 𝐸𝑑. 
 
Source: Dekun Zou, Yun Q. Shi, Wei Su, Guorong Xuan, “Steganalysis Based on Markov Model of 
Thresholded Prediction-error Image,” Multimedia and Expo, 2006 IEEE International Conference on DOI: 
10.1109/ICME.2006.262792 
 
Compared with Sullivan et al.’s [33] scheme, the detection rate of Markov Model 
of prediction-error is absolutely higher. When detecting LSB in 0.3 bpp with linear SVM, 
this technique obtains 92.92% accuracy. However, Sullivan et al.’s method gain 65.68%. 
The result displayed in Table 2.4 and Table 2.5 
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Table 2.4  Results of Two Steganalysis Method with Linear SVM 
Embedding Method Zou et al.’s Sullivan et al.’s 
Cox’s SS 80.58% 75.81% 
Piva’s SS 88.57% 76.34% 
LSB(0.1 bpp) 77.27% 53.73% 
LSB(0.2 bpp) 88.27% 60.15% 
LSB(0.3 bpp) 92.91% 65.68% 
 
Table 2.5  Results of Two Steganalysis Method with Non-Linear SVM 
Embedding Method Zou et al.’s Sullivan et al.’s 
Cox’s SS 89.15% 77.60% 
Piva’s SS 94.10% 77.58% 
LSB(0.1 bpp) 86.30% 49.82% 
LSB(0.2 bpp) 94.45% 61.13% 
LSB(0.3 bpp) 97.75% 68.98% 
 
Source: Dekun Zou, Yun Q. Shi, Wei Su, Guorong Xuan, “Steganalysis Based on Markov Model of 
Thresholded Prediction-error Image,” Multimedia and Expo, 2006 IEEE International Conference on DOI: 
10.1109/ICME.2006.262792 
 
2.5.3 Multi-Directional JPEG Attack 
Xuan et al. [31] also presented a scheme based on Markov process in 2007. They 
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modeled the 2-D JPEG coefficient array by using Markov model. There is three different 
scanning orders – zigzag, horizontal and vertical. Unlike single direction scanning, multi-
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Figure 2.15 Vertical scanning order. 
 
Source: Guorong Xuan, Xia Cui ; Shi, Y.Q. ; Wen Chen ; Xuefeng Tong ; Cong Huang, “JPEG Steganalysis 
Based on Classwise Non-principal Components Analysis and Multi-directional Markov Model,” Multimedia 
and Expo, 2007 IEEE International Conference on, 2-5 July 2007, pp. 903-906, DOI:10.1109/ 
ICME.2007.4284797 
 
where the numbers 0, 1, …, 20 represent the sequence of the low-frequency coefficients.  
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In the JPEG 8 × 8  DCT blocks, most of high frequency coefficients after 
quantization are zero, whereas low frequency AC coefficients are often non-zero and 
utilized by JPEG steganography.  
Therefore, low frequency coefficients are scanned to generate three coefficient 
sequences, each consisting of the DC coefficient and the first twenty low-frequency AC 
coefficients.  
In 2-D Markov chain of thresholded prediction-error image, the distortions 
introduced by data hiding are usually small comparing to the presence of different objects. 
Otherwise, the distortion will raise alarm when inspected by human eyes. Therefore, a 
predefined threshold T is adopted and the prediction errors are adjusted according to the 
following rule. 
 
𝑒(𝑖, 𝑗) = {
𝑒(𝑖, 𝑗) |𝑒(𝑖, 𝑗)| < 𝑇





Large prediction errors are regarded as 0. At this point, the range of the prediction-
error image are limited to [−𝑇, 𝑇], which means only 2 × 𝑇 + 1 values left. 
Since the dynamic range of JPEG coefficient is large, the dimension of transition 
matrix is non-trivial. In order to reduce complexity, they also proposed that make a 





Table 2.6  Percentage of AC Coefficients in [−𝑇, 𝑇] 
[−𝑇, 𝑇] [-5,5] [-6,6] [-7,7] [-8,8] [-9,9] 
Percentage 97.3 98.1 98.6 98.9 99.2 
 
Source: Guorong Xuan, Xia Cui ; Shi, Y.Q. ; Wen Chen ; Xuefeng Tong ; Cong Huang, “JPEG Steganalysis 
Based on Classwise Non-principal Components Analysis and Multi-directional Markov Model,” Multimedia 
and Expo, 2007 IEEE International Conference on, 2-5 July 2007, pp. 903-906, DOI:10.1109/ 
ICME.2007.4284797 
 
Table 2.6 shows that most JPEG coefficients are falling into the selected threshold 
arrange, indicating that the information loss is negligible for these threshold values. 
With the same quality factor, the length of embedded message is 0.04bpp. To 
evaluate the performance of the proposed approach, the 1096 BMP images with size of 
768x512 embedded with F5, MB1 and MB2, Xuan et al.  
Detection accuracy of Xuan et al.’s method is displayed in Table 2.7. 
 
Table 2.7  Detection Accuracy 
Payload Fridrich[39] Xuan et al. 
F5 87% 92% 
OG 97% 100% 
MB1 86% 97% 
MB2 84% 99% 
 
Source: Guorong Xuan, Xia Cui ; Shi, Y.Q. ; Wen Chen ; Xuefeng Tong ; Cong Huang, “JPEG Steganalysis 
Based on Classwise Non-principal Components Analysis and Multi-directional Markov Model,” Multimedia 




2.6 Co-occurrence Matrix 
2.6.1 Coefficient Difference Features 
In 2013, Li et al. [9] proposed scheme employs 15700 dimensional features calculated from 
the co-occurrence matrices of DCT. This algorithm is comprised of two parts: feature 
extraction and Bayesian ensemble classifier. In the first part, they calculated a high-
dimensional feature vector generated from each JPEG image in a training set which 
contains original and stego samples. In the second part, a group of sub-classifiers trained 
on those feature vectors is integrated to make optimized decisions for suspicious images 
by Bayesian mechanism [25]. 
The features extraction also include two parts: one part is generated from the 
coefficient co-occurrence matrices, which are proposed by Kodovsky et al. [18]. While 
another part is derived from the co-occurrence matrices of coefficient differences, both the 
coefficient features and the difference features will contribute to the steganalysis.  
Kodovsky et al. [18] designed 7850-dimensional features which extracted from the 
co-occurrence matrices of DCT coefficient pairs. Since both the intra-block and inter-block 
dependencies are represented by the features, the steganalysis method can effectively 
detect the hidden data in JPEG images. 
Li et al. defined the differences of adjacent coefficients along the horizontal, 





(ℎ) (𝑢, 𝑣) = 𝑐𝑚,𝑛(𝑢, 𝑣) − 𝑐𝑚,𝑛(𝑢 + 1, 𝑣)  (2.39) 
 
𝑑𝑚,𝑛
(𝑣) (𝑢, 𝑣) = 𝑐𝑚,𝑛(𝑢, 𝑣) − 𝑐𝑚,𝑛(𝑢, 𝑣 + 1)  (2.40) 
 
𝑑𝑚,𝑛
(𝑑) (𝑢, 𝑣) = 𝑐𝑚,𝑛(𝑢, 𝑣) − 𝑐𝑚,𝑛(𝑢 + 1, 𝑣 + 1)  (2.41) 
 
𝑑𝑚,𝑛
(𝑚)(𝑢, 𝑣) = 𝑐𝑚,𝑛(𝑢 + 1, 𝑣) − 𝑐𝑚,𝑛(𝑢, 𝑣 + 1)  (2.42) 
 
In order to lower the complexity, they change values of DCT coefficient and values 
of DCT difference into [−𝑇, 𝑇]. 
 
𝑐?̅?,𝑛(𝑢, 𝑣) = {
𝑇, 𝑖𝑓 𝑐𝑚,𝑛(𝑢, 𝑣)  ≥ 𝑇
𝑐𝑚,𝑛(𝑢, 𝑣), 𝑖𝑓 − 𝑇 <  𝑐𝑚,𝑛(𝑢, 𝑣)  < 𝑇










 𝑇, 𝑖𝑓 𝑑𝑚,𝑛
(𝑠) (𝑢, 𝑣)  ≥ 𝑇
𝑑𝑚,𝑛
(𝑠) (𝑢, 𝑣), 𝑖𝑓 − 𝑇 < 𝑑𝑚,𝑛
(𝑠) (𝑢, 𝑣)  < 𝑇
−𝑇, 𝑖𝑓𝑑𝑚,𝑛





 [𝑐?̅?,𝑛(𝑢, 𝑣), 𝑐?̅?+△𝑚,,𝑛+△𝑛(𝑢 +△ 𝑢, 𝑣 +△ 𝑣)] and [?̅?𝑚,𝑛
(𝑠) (𝑢, 𝑣), ?̅?𝑚+△𝑚,𝑛+△𝑛
(𝑠) (𝑢 +△ 𝑢, 𝑣 +
△ 𝑣)] are the coefficient pair and difference pair for the index block (𝑚, 𝑛), coefficient 
position (𝑢, 𝑣) and offset (△ 𝑢,△ 𝑣,△ 𝑚,△ 𝑛). 
Li et al. calculated the co-occurrence matrices of both coefficient pairs and difference 
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(𝑢, 𝑣) = 𝑥, ?̅?𝑚+△𝑚,𝑛+△𝑛







Since all DCT coefficients and coefficient difference are truncated to [-3, 3], there 
are 49 elements in 𝐂 and 𝐃. Then fold the two kinds of matrices: 
 
?̅?(𝑥, 𝑦) = 𝐌(𝑥, 𝑦) + 𝐌(𝑦, 𝑥)  (2.47) 
 
where 𝐌 ∈ {𝐂,𝐃}. 
What’s more, they used Cartesian calibration method [41] to produce other 7850 
features. Hence a total of 15700 high dimensional features firstly are used to train for 
steganalysis. 
Since there are a total of 15700 high dimensional feature set used for steganalysis. 
The extracted features firstly are used to train a number of sub-classifiers, which are 
integrated as an ensemble classifier with a Bayesian mechanism. In construction of each 
sub classifier d features from 15700 are used to train Fisher linear discriminate (FLD) 
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classifier [42] by using the N sub-vectors. 
Threshold in the FLD classifier is determined by the minimal sum of probabilities 
of false alarm and miss detection. By using the searching algorithm, they found 600 and 
201 sub classifiers obtained with different subset of features is the optimal value. 
In the experiment, Li et al. used the proposed steganalytic scheme to detect the 
secret data embedded by two steganographic methods nsF5 and model-based 
steganography (MBS) [42]. 
As a result, the error of merging the two sets of features is only 3.3%, in contrast, 
the error of CF* is 6.5% at payload 0.10 bpac. On the other hand, by replacing the majority-
voting mechanism with the Bayesian mechanism, can be lowered by 0.4%–1% (from 96.7% 
to 95.9%). That means the proposed scheme benefits from both the merged features and 




2.6.2 Rich Models 
Fridrich et al. [10] proposed a general method for steganalysis of digital images in 2012, 
which based on the concept of a rich model consisting of a large number of diverse 
submodels. The submodels consider various types of relationships among neighboring 
samples of noise residuals obtained by linear and non-linear filters with compact supports. 
They made the model assembly by a part of the training process driven by samples drawn 
from the corresponding cover and stego sources. In order to increase the detection accuracy, 
they also apply a submodel-selection to adopt different steganographic techniques: HUGO, 
edge adaptive algorithm by Luo et al. [43], and optimally coded ternary ±1 embedding.  
Ensemble classifiers are used to assemble the model as the steganalyzer because of 
their low computational complexity and ability to efficiently work with high-dimensional 
feature spaces and lager training sets. 
Rich model focuses on the spatial domain because the best detection is usually 
achieved by building the model directly in the domain where the embedding changes are 
localized. The rich model steps shows as following. 
 
A. Residual Images 
Fridrich et al. formed the model by merging many smaller submodels instead of a single 
model because the single model will not produce a good results as the enlarged model will 
have too many underpopulated bins. 
1) Computing Residuals: The submodel are formed from noise residuals, R = 
(R𝑖𝑗)  ∈ ℝ




𝑅𝑖𝑗 = ?̂?𝑖𝑗(𝒩𝑖𝑗) − 𝑐𝑋𝑖𝑗  (2.48) 
 
where 𝑐 ∈ ℕ is the residual order, 𝒩𝑖𝑗 is a local neighborhood of pixel 𝑋𝑖𝑗, 𝑋𝑖𝑗 ∉ 𝒩𝑖𝑗, 
and ?̂?𝑖𝑗(∙) is a predictor of 𝑐𝑋𝑖𝑗 defined on 𝒩𝑖𝑗. The set {𝑋𝑖𝑗,𝒩𝑖𝑗} is called the support 
of the residual. 
All residuals used in the rich model are shown in Figure 2.16. They are built as 
locally supported linear filters whose outputs are possibly combined with minimum and 
maximum operators to increase their diversity.  
If there are two or more different symbols other than the black dot, we can call it 
‘minmax’. While in type ’spam’, the residual is computed as a linear high-pass filter of 
neighboring pixels with the corresponding coefficients. For example: 2a stands for the 
second-order 𝑅𝑖𝑗 = 𝑋𝑖,𝑗−1 + 𝑋𝑖,𝑗+1 − 2𝑋𝑖𝑗 and 1a for the first-order 𝑅𝑖𝑗  =  𝑋𝑖,𝑗+1 − 𝑋𝑖𝑗. 
2b is obtained as 𝑅𝑖𝑗 =  𝑚𝑖𝑛{𝑋𝑖,𝑗−1 + 𝑋𝑖,𝑗+1 − 2𝑋𝑖𝑗 , 𝑋𝑖−1,𝑗 + 𝑋𝑖+1,𝑗 − 2𝑋𝑖𝑗}. 
The ‘min’ and ‘max’ operators introduce non-linearity into the residuals and 
increase the model diversity. All operations make the distribution of the residual samples 





Figure 2.16 Definitions of all residuals. The residuals 3a – 3h are defined similar to the first-order residuals, while E5a – E5d are similar 
to E3a – E3d defined using the corresponding part of the 5 × 5 kernel displayed in S5a.  
 





1a) spam14h,v 1b) minmax22h,v 1c) minmax24 1d) minmax34h,v 
1e) minmax41 1f) minmax34 1g) minmax48h,v 1h) minmax54 
2a) spam12h,v 2b) minmax21 2c) minmax41 2d) minmax24h,v 2e) minmax32 
E3a) spam14h,v E3b) minmax24 E3c) minmax22h,v E3d) minmax41 








2) Truncation and Quantization: Each submodel is formed from a quantized and 
truncated version of the residual: 
 






where q > 0 is a quantization step. 
The authors acknowledge that the individual performance of each submodel can 
likely be improved by replacing the simple scalar quantizer with an optimized design. 
To select the quantization step q. 
 
𝑞 ∈ {
{𝑐, 1.5𝑐, 2𝑐} for 𝑐 > 1
{1,2} for 𝑐 = 1
  (2.50) 
 
 
3) Co-Occurrences: Those submodels will be constructed from horizontal and 
vertical co-occurrences of four consecutive residual samples. Formally, each co-
occurrence matrix C is a four-dimensional array indexed with 𝒅 =  (𝑑1, 𝑑2, 𝑑3, 𝑑4, ) ∈
𝒯4 ≜ {−𝑇, . . . , 𝑇}
4, which gives the array (2T + 1)4 = 625 elements.  
The 𝒅th element of the horizontal co-occurrence for residual 𝑹 =  (𝑅𝑖𝑗) means 
the number of groups of four neighboring residual samples with values equal to 














where Z is the normalization factor ensuring that ∑ 𝐶𝑑
(ℎ)
𝑑∈𝒯4 = 1. 
Individual submodels of the rich image model obtained by 78 co-occurrence 
matrices shown in Figure 2.16 by leveraging symmetries of natural images. Fridrich used 
the sign-symmetry as well as the directional symmetry of images, making those models 
more compact and improving the performance to dimensionality ratio. Different types of 
residuals were applied with different symmetrized methods, like ‘spam’ 𝐶𝑑̅̅ ̅ ← 𝐶𝑑 + 𝐶−𝑑, 
𝐶𝑑̿̿ ̿ ← 𝐶?̅? + 𝐶̅?⃖? , while the ‘minmax’ residuals will be possessed like 𝐶𝑑





,  𝐶𝑑̿̿ ̿ ← 𝐶?̅? + 𝐶̅?⃖? . When all submodels are put together, their combined 
dimensionality is only 12,753.  
The framework is demonstrated on three stego algorithms operating in the spatial 
domain: ±1 embedding and two content-adaptive methods: HUGO and an edge-adaptive 
method by Luo et al. They used the best rich model when were assembled at dimensions 
approximately 3300 and trained by ensemble classifier [32] and Gaussian SVM [44]. The 





Table 2.8  Detection Error for Three Algorithms for Payload 0.4 bpp when Ensemble is 
Used with the Rich 12753-Dimensional Model 
Algorithm 
Ensemble G-SVM 
MED MAD MED MAD 
±1 Embedding 0.0785 0.0035 0.00683 0.0042 
HUGO 0.1355 0.0035 0.1310 0.0065 
EA 0.0695 0.0020 0.0643 0.0030 
 
Table 2.9  The Average Running Time of The Experiments in Table 2.8 
Algorithm Ensemble G-SVM 
±1 Embedding 1 hr 20 min 4 days 22 hr 37 min 
HUGO 4 hr 35 min 8 days 15 hr 31 min 
EA 3 hr 09 min 3 days 23 hr 50 min 
 
Source: Jessica Fridrich and Jan Kodovský,” Rich Models for Steganalysis of Digital Images,” IEEE Trans. 
on Info. Forensics and Security, vol. 7(3), pp. 868-882, 2012 
 
In Table 2.8, writers compared results with the detection error of classifiers 
implemented as ensembles using the 12,753-dimensional rich model in 0.4 bpp payload 
dataset. Interestingly, the smaller model with a G-SVM provided better detection results. 
The improvement is roughly by 0.5–1% over all three steganographic methods. While the 
running time of a G-SVM classifier was 30–90 times higher than the running time of the 








With the development of steganalysis, more and more techniques are involved in this area. 
The diversity of steganalysis can provide theoretical foundation and promote the 
development of detecting method. In this chapter, game theory and deep learning, which 
have never been used in steganalysis before, will be presented. Game theory is a theory to 
analyze the interaction between Alice and Bob in steganography and steganalysis. The 
value of this work lies primarily in shedding more light on the problem of optimal 
steganography. And the convolution layers in deep learning may be of great assistance to 
feature extraction in researches for steganalysis. 
 
3.2 Game Theory Approach 
3.2.1 Concept 
Game theory is the study of strategic decision making. Specifically, it is "the study of 
mathematical models of conflict and cooperation between intelligent rational decision-
makers."[22] 
“The prisoner’s problem” can illustrate game theory clearly. Alice and Bob were 
caught transferring state secrets. Now, sadly, they separated into two rooms, homeland 
security tries to get them to confess. They are each told independently that if they both 
confess, they will be put in prison for two years. If one confesses and the other does not, 
the confessor will be let free in exchange for testifying against the other, who will receive 
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four years in prison. If they both keep quiet they will be let off with a slap on wrist: one 
year each. The outcomes are represented in the following table: 
 
Table 3.1  All Results of Alice and Bob’s Decision 
 Confess Decline 
Confess 2 , 2 0 , 4 
Decline 4 , 0 1 , 1 
 
When the equilibrium is stable: both players confess. If Alice knows that Bob will 
confess, then she can do nothing but confess: we can see from the equilibrium it result in a 
four year for her, if she keeps silent. Of course it is possible that both players will choose 
not to confess, but this is an unstable equilibrium. If Alice gets wind of the fact that Bob 
plans to stay quiet, she’ll turn him in! And if bob in turn realizes this, he will choose to 
confess as well. Hence, while this situation can occur, in some instances it is an “unstable” 
outcome. 
This steganalysis is attempting to analyze the interaction between Alice and Bob. 
Writers focus on the modern steganographic embedding paradigm based on minimizing an 
additive distortion function. 
Content-adaptive steganography constrains its embedding changes to those parts of 
image where one expects their detection to be harder. In steganography, that minimizes an 




1 + exp (−𝜆𝜌𝑖)
  (3.1) 
 
61 
where 𝜌𝑖 > 0 is the costs of changing pixel 𝑖. The cost 𝜌𝑖 are usually obtained by using 
some deterministic rule, which is applied to the cover image. 
Since the stego image is a slightly modified version of the cover image, Bob could 
estimate the set of change rate. Since the introduction of content-adaptive stego schemes, 
it has been hypothesized that any information about the selection channel given to Bob 
could be used to improve her detection. 
Considering half of a cover image is composed of random noise while the other 
half is a completely flat content, it is far better for Alice to embed in the random part even 
though Bob knows it. In fact, the sender could even hide data with perfect security using 
naive embedding if she knew the cover model. Obviously, the information about the 
selection channel available to Bob may be a weakness only to a degree depending on how 
detectable the changes are at each pixel. So Tomáš considered two options for Alice: (1) 
Assuming an omnipotent Bob, she also knows Alice’s actions. (2) Assuming that Bob has 
no idea about the probabilities with which Alice changes each pixel. 
 
3.2.2 Cover Model and Embedding Method 
A. Cover Model 
When choosing a cover image, we should ignore the noise components by staying 
consistently the same, like taking the same picture multiple times with the same camera 
settings, the remaining noise components are random in nature and well modeled as an 
independent Gaussian noise. The cover model using is a simplified model for one channel 




𝐗 = (𝑋1, … , 𝑋𝑛), 𝑋𝑖~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑖
2), i = 1,… , 𝑛  (3.2) 
 
B. Embedding Method 
In Tomáš’s paper [11], LSB matching is chosen for simplicity. Denoting the stego image 
𝐘 =  (𝑌1, . . . , 𝑌𝑛),  Alice changes pixel 𝑥𝑖  by ±1 with probability 𝜌𝑖
(𝐴)
 and leaves it 




Pr(𝑌1 = 𝑥𝑖 + 𝑠𝑖) = {
𝜌𝑖
(𝐴)
/2 for 𝑠𝑖 = −1 
1 − 𝜌𝑖
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for 𝑠𝑖 = 0
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= 𝛼𝑛  (3.5) 
 
Thus, Alice’s action is captured with 𝑛 − 1 parameters: 𝜌𝑖
(𝐴)
, 𝑖 = 1,… , 𝑛 − 1 as 
𝜌𝑛
(𝐴)





A. Detector Concept 
Bob will run a simple binary hypothesis test. The null hypothesis corresponds to observing 
a cover image, while the alternative hypothesis corresponds to a stego object. 

















B. Payoff Function 
Some scalar characteristic is needed in the detector as a payoff function. While they adopt 






(𝑃𝐹𝐴 + 𝑃𝑀𝐷(𝑃𝐹𝐴))  (3.7) 
 
𝑃𝐹𝐴 and 𝑃𝑀𝐷  are the probabilities of false detection. To evaluate the payoff function, 
Writers compute the distribution of Bob’s statistic under both hypotheses. C.d.f. obtained 








  (3.8) 
The p.d.f. is obtained by differentiating w.r.t.𝑦: 
 
ℎ(𝑦) = 𝑓𝛽(𝐴)(𝑥, 𝜎𝑖
2)𝑥′+(𝑦) − 𝑓𝛽(𝐴)(𝑥, 𝜎𝑖
2)𝑥′−(𝑦)  (3.9) 
 
C. Strategies 




, … , 𝛽𝑛−1
(𝐴)




, … , 𝛽𝑛−1
(𝑊)
}  (3.11) 
 
 
3.2.4 Solution of Game Theory 
A game with continuous strategies and a smooth payoff function admits solution in pure 
strategies, which coincides with the saddle point, the Nash equilibrium. The solution can 
be determined numerically using a gradient search in which the payoff function is 





Figure 3.1 Payoff function P𝐸(𝜌1
(𝐴), 𝜌1
(𝑊)) for α = 0.2, 𝜎1
2 = 1, 𝜎2
2 = 1.2. 
 
Source: Tomáš Denemark and Jessica Fridrich,” Detection of Content Adaptive LSB Matching (a Game 
Theory Approach),” Media Watermarking, Security, and Forensics 2014, vol. 9028, San Francisco, CA, 
February 26, 2014. 
 
For a two-pixel cover, the one-dimensional strategies must lie in a range determined 
by the payload，𝜌1
(𝐴), 𝜌1
(𝑊) ∈ [𝛽𝑚𝑖𝑛, 𝛽𝑚𝑎𝑥], where  
 
𝛽𝑚𝑎𝑥 = min (0.5, ℎ
−1(2𝛼))  (3.12) 
   
𝛽𝑚𝑖𝑛 = ℎ
−1(2𝛼 − ℎ(𝛽𝑚𝑎𝑥))  (3.13) 
 
where ℎ−1(𝑥) is the inverse binary entropy on [0,1/2].  
The value of this work lies primarily in shedding more light on the problem of 




3.3 Deep Learning 
Qian et al. [17] proposed a customized Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) called 
Gaussian-Neuron CNN (GNCNN) for steganalysis. This model can automatically learn to 
extract feature by several convolutional layers. 
 
3.3.1 CNN 
In deep learning, a Convolutional Neural Network [23] is comprised of one or more 
convolutional layers and then followed by one or more fully connected layers. The 
architecture of a CNN is designed to take advantage of the 2D structure of an input image. 
Additionally, CNNs is easy to train with fewer parameters compared with other fully 
connected networks with the same number of hidden units. 
Either before or after the subsampling layer an additive bias and sigmoidal 
nonlinearity is applied to each feature map. The figure below illustrates a full layer in a 
CNN consisting of convolutional and subsampling sublayers.  
Here are the reasons of choosing CNN as the basic framework: 
1. CNNs can take raw data as inputs without the need for a feature extraction step, 
which means that only learning feature representations from images instead of 
treating a CNN. 
2. The data processed by CNN is easy to use in steganalysis, regarding covers and 
stegos as positive and negative samples. 
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3. CNN can be trained the models on large scale. 
Qian customized the CNN as a GNCNN shows in Figure 3.2. 
 
3.3.2 Image Processing 
Generally, the high frequency stego noise added to the cover is a kind of very weak signal, 
which is greatly impacted by image content. Hence, reduce the impact of image content 
and strengthen the weak stego signal, Qian apply a high pass filter. 
 
 
Figure 3.2 The GNCNN model (right) and traditional steganalysis architecture based on 
hand-crafted features (left). The up and down arrows in the right flowchart show forward 
and back propagation directions. 
 
Source: Yinlong Qian, Jing Dong, Wei Wang, Tieniu Tan, “Deep learning for steganalysis via convolutional 




𝑅 is the image after high-pass filtering, 𝐼 denotes an image and 𝐾 is a shift-
invariant finite-impulse response linear filter to compute the residual. 
 
𝑅 = 𝐾 ∗ 𝐼  (3.14) 
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3.3.3 Convolutional Layer 
The input and output of each convolutional layer are sets of arrays called feature maps. At 
the output, each feature map is a particular feature representation extracted at all locations 
on the input. At a convolutional layer, three kinds of operations, which are convolution, 
non-linearity, and pooling, are usually applied sequentially as expressed below. 
 
𝑋𝑗








where 𝑓(∙) as the non-linearity operation, pool(∙) denotes pooling, 𝑋𝑖
𝑙−1  is the 𝑗-th 
feature map in layer 𝑙, 𝐾𝑖𝑗 is the trainable convolution kernel connecting the 𝑗-th output 
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map and the 𝑖-th input map, 𝑏𝑗
𝑙 is an trainable bias parameter for the 𝑗-th output map. 
For natural images, it is common that, subsequent in-camera processing during 
image acquisition, such as color interpolation, color correction and filtering, introduces 
complex dependencies into noise component of neighboring pixels. Most steganalysis 
methods try to utilize these dependencies to detect stego noise. Because of the complex 
dependencies, a good estimate of the central pixel can be obtained from the neighboring 
pixels, excluding the pixel being estimated. Then by subtracting the true value of the central 
pixel from the estimated one, the prediction error value can be obtained, which directly 
reflects whether the pixel is changed or not. 
 
Figure 3.3 A Simple example illustrating why Gaussian activation works for steganalysis 
in the proposed model. Gaussian activation can distinguish between stego signals and cover 
signal from the prediction error values. 
 
Source: Yinlong Qian, Jing Dong, Wei Wang, Tieniu Tan, “Deep learning for steganalysis via convolutional 











As mentioned, the aim of convolution operation is to compute prediction error 
values by exploiting the dependencies among neighboring elements. The motivation 
behind Gaussian non-linearity is to transform prediction error values to distinguish between 
stego signals and cover signals.  
Figure 3.3 gives a simple example of why Gaussian activation works. Ideally, it is 
supposed that there should be three kinds of prediction error values: 1, -1 and 0. The values 
1 and -1 means that the pixel is modified by embedding operation, a stego signal. The value 
0 means that the pixel is unchanged, which means this is a cover signal. 
The resulting activations are then passed to the pooling part of the layer. Pooling 
operation aims to transform the low level feature representation into a more usable one 
which preserves important information and discards irrelevant details. Pooling has the 
effect of merging the information within a set of small local regions while reducing 
computation time. In a pooling operation, the outputs of neighboring groups of neurons in 
the same feature map are summarized. 
Generally, there are two conventional choices for pooling: average pooling and max 



















where 𝑅𝑗 is pooling region 𝑗 in a feature map, 𝑎𝑖 is the 𝑖-th element within it. 
In their proposed model, rather than max pooling, they use average pooling. 
Because in average pooling, all the activations in the pooling region are taken into account, 
which is supposed to discard the disturbances caused by individual elements. By merging 
all the signal within the pooling region, the stego signal on the whole region is strengthen. 
 
3.3.4 Classification Layer 
The classification module consists of several fully connected layers. The learned features 
are passed to these layers. On the top layer, an activation function is used to produce a 













Qian et al. carried out on the standardized database called BOSSbase 1.01.22. This database 
contains 10,000 images acquired by seven digital cameras. 
 
Table 3.2  Detection Error of GNCNN Model VS. The SRM Set Implemented with 
Ensemble Classifiers and the SPAM Set Implemented with a Gaussian SVM for Three 
State-of-the-Art Spatial Domain Steganographic Algorithms 
bpp 



















0.3 33.8% 29.6% 42.9% 34.3% 31.2% 42.2% 35.9% 31.5% 40.0% 
0.4 28.9% 25.2% 39.1% 29.3% 25.7% 38.2% 30.9% 26.3% 35.1% 
0.5 25.7% 21.4% 35.7% 24.8% 22.1% 34.9% 26.3% 21.4% 30.6% 
 
Source: Yinlong Qian, Jing Dong, Wei Wang, Tieniu Tan, “Deep learning for steganalysis via convolutional 
neural networks,” SPIE 9409, Media Watermarking, Security, and Forensics 2015, 94090J (4 March 2015); 
DOI: 10.1117/12.2083479. 
 
For BOSSbase, across all three embedding algorithms and payloads, the method 
with deep learning achieves a much lower detection error than the SPAM set implemented 
with a Gaussian SVM. When compared to the SRM set implemented with ensemble 
classifiers, the detection error is just about 2% − 5% higher depending on the payload. 







4.1 Textural Features 
4.1.1 Introduction 
Shi et al. [3] learned and utilized the textural features from the rich literature in the field of 
texture classification for further development of the modern steganalysis. They have 
applied textural features to steganalyzing the HUGO stego dataset designed for the BOSS 
contest. In this scheme, they construct a steganalyzer with 22,153 features derived from 
the textural features. 
They applied LBP in 59 dimensional features and used these for some filtered 2-D 
array. Meanwhile, 256 dimension and variance features derived from the multi-resolution 
way were used for others.  
In addition, they used Laws mask and the mask and cliques associated with Markov 
Random fields. And the classifier utilized is the FLD-based ensemble classifier.  
 
4.1.2 Framework 
HUGO tended to embed data into cover image locally into some regions so as to make the 
image statistical modeling difficult, especially into highly texture regions. While the LBP 




A. Image Statistical Measures 
Ojala et al. [34] proposed LBP to model the statistics of a texture unit defined within a 
neighborhood of 3×3 pixels. Each of eight neighboring pixels of a 3×3 neighborhood is 
thresholded by the gray value of its central pixel to form an 8-bit binary pattern shown in 
Figure 4.1(a). We can see that the Figure 4.1(b) is a version of LBPs. The LBP is circular 
with different radius, the pixel values of the neighbors falling outside the center of the pixel 
grids are estimated by interpolation. While Figure 4.1(c) is a derivation of Figure 4.1(b). 
There are two kinds of LBP: uniform and non-uniform patterns. The uniform patterns have 
the number of binary transitions over the whole neighborhood circle less than two, while 
the number of transitions that are greater than two are considered as non-uniform. Uniform 
patterns often occupy the majority of the histogram which makes merging non-uniform 
patterns into the same bin. In this situation, we can reduce the number of bins in a histogram 
from 256 to 59. 
 
(a)                (b)                  (c) 
Figure 4.1 (a) 3×3 neighborhood. (b) Example of circular symmetric neighborhood. (c) 




Generalized to different 𝑃  values and correspondingly defined neighborhoods, 
Equation 4.1 expresses the formulation of LBP shown in Figure 4.1(a) mathematically. 
 







where s(x) equals one if the x is less than or equal to zero, or zero otherwise. 
From experiments, they found that features generated from LBP8 are much more 
powerful than those from co-occurrence matrix but with a higher dimensionality. Features 
generated from LBP perform slightly better than those from co-occurrence matrix although 
they are of lower dimensionality.  
 
4.1.3 Content-Adaptive Prediction Error Image 
Small perturbation to cover image caused by steganographic schemes may be 
considered as a high frequency additive noise; as a result, eliminating low-frequency 
representation of images before feature extraction process would make the resulting image 
features better represent the underlying statistical artifacts associated with steganography.  
With the modern steganographic schemes such as HUGO, it is intuitive that the 
prediction error images, like residual images, generated in a content adaptive manner 
would effectively reveal such artifacts caused by data embedding. Denoting 𝐼 as image, 
𝑅 as residual image, and 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑(𝐼) as corresponding predicted image:  
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𝑅 = 𝐼 − 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑(𝐼)  (4.2) 
 
 
Figure 4.2 2×2 Neighboorhood used to predict the center pixel of a 3×3 neighborhood. 
 
 
(a)                  (b)                            (c) 
Figure 4.3 Symbolic representations of pixel locations used in the creation of median-
filter-based prediction error images. (a) 3×3, (b) 5×5, and (c) 7×7 neighborhood. 
 
Table 4.1  Configuration of Median Filters Employed in Generating Median-Filter-Based 
Prediction Error Images 
 
 
Source: Yun Q. Shi, Patchara Sutthiwan, Licong Chen,Shi, “Textural Features for Steganalysis,” IH'12 
Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Information Hiding, 2012, pp 63-77 
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Table 4.2  High-Pass Filters Employed in the Creation of Residual Images 
 
 
Source: Yun Q. Shi, Patchara Sutthiwan, Licong Chen,Shi, “Textural Features for Steganalysis,” IH'12 
Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Information Hiding, 2012, pp 63-77 
 
 
Table 4.1 shows some spatial filters which have been widely used as low-pass 
filters. It can generate residual images by using median filters to compute predicted images.  
Writers also generate some residual images in this part in a content adaptive manner 
by incorporating two non-linear operators, minimum and maximum in order to catch the 
desired artifacts. 
Image statistical features is formulated by two major set of 1-D spatial high-pass 
filters. The first set of high-pass filters is Laws’ mask which are odd sizes, while the other 




Figure 4.4 High-pass filters based on Markov neighborhoods. 
 
Source: Yun Q. Shi, Patchara Sutthiwan, Licong Chen, “Textural Features for Steganalysis,” IH'12 
Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Information Hiding, 2012, pp. 63-77 
 
The Figure 4.4 and Figure 4.5 show the mask based on Markov. Markov Random 





Figure 4.5 High-pass filters based on Cliques. 
 
Source: Yun Q. Shi, Patchara Sutthiwan, Licong Chen, “Textural Features for Steganalysis,” IH'12 
Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Information Hiding, 2012, pp. 63-77 
 
In MRF, a neighborhood can be constructed, which the Markov parameters can be 
assigned as weights. These neighborhoods are characterized by a group of pixels with a 
variety of orientations often symmetrically inscribed within a square window of odd size. 
For steganalysis, Markov neighborhood should be for high-pass filtering instead of texture 





With a variety of features made in the above section, there are multiple ways to construct 
a feature set for steganalysis. An effective combination of features with a dimensionality 
of 22,153 is constructed based on the HUGO at 0.4 bpp on BOSSbase 0.92 which contains 
of 10,000 images. All the LBP operators used to construct features are based on uniformity 
mapping with 𝑃 = 8 and different combination of R’s. Whole feature sets with each 
individual type of features dropped out are evaluated and shown in Table 4.3 
 
Table 4.3  Ensemble Performance on Feature Elimination at d = 2,600 
Feature Set D AC L 
Whole 22,593 83.92% 50 
Whole-Pes 21,268 83.57% 46 
Whole-VARpe 21,268 83.57% 57 
Whole-MEDpe 20,560 83.67% 63 
Whole-LMased 9,763 82.72% 65 
Whole-MN13 18,825 83.52% 45 
Whole-CL12 19,081 83.67% 52 
 
Source: Yun Q. Shi, Patchara Sutthiwan, Licong Chen, “Textural Features for Steganalysis,” IH'12 
Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Information Hiding, 2012, pp. 63-77 
 
The statistics in Table 4.3 reveals that each type of the proposed features is essential 








4.2 Ensemble Classifier 
4.3.1 Introduction 
To reconstruct the method, we will use the ensemble classifier as described in Shi’s paper. 
The ensemble classifier [18] is essentially a random forest consisting of L binary classifiers 
called base learners, 𝐵𝑙,  𝑙 =  1, . . . , 𝐿, each trained on a different dsub-dimensional 
subspace of the feature space selected uniformly at random. Each random subspace will be 
described using an index set {1, . . . , 𝑑}, |𝐷𝑙|  =  𝑑𝑠𝑢𝑏. The ensemble reaches its decision 
by fusing all L decisions of individual base learners using majority voting. 
 
Figure 4.6 Diagram illustrating the ensemble classifier. 
 
4.2.2 Algorithm 
To formally describe the ensemble classifier, we introduce the following notation. The 
symbol d stands for the feature space dimensionality, d𝑠𝑢𝑏 for the dimensionality of the 
Feature 
space 




Base learner 𝐵1 
Base learner 𝐵1 





feature subspace on which each base learner operates, N𝑡𝑟𝑛 and N𝑡𝑠𝑡 are the number of 
training and testing examples from each class, and L is the number of base learners.  
Steps of algorithm are as follows. 
1. For 𝑙 = 1 to 𝐿 form a random subspace 
 
𝒟𝑙 ⊂ {1, … , 𝑑}, |𝒟𝑙| = 𝑑𝑠𝑢𝑏 < 𝑑  (4.3) 
 
2. Forming a bootstrap sample 𝒩𝑙
𝑏 , |𝒩𝑙
𝑏| = 𝑁𝑡𝑟𝑛  by uniform sampling with 
replacement form the set {1, … ,𝑁𝑡𝑟𝑛}. 







  (4.4) 
 
to obtain eigenvector 𝑣𝑙 and threshold 𝑇𝑙. 
4. For all test examples 𝑦 ∈ 𝒴𝑡𝑠𝑡 make 𝑙th decisions: 
 
𝐵𝑙(𝑢
(𝒟𝑙)) ≜ {1 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝐯𝑙
𝑇𝒚(𝒟𝑙) > 𝑇𝑙
0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
  (4.5) 
 
5. If 𝑙 = 𝐿, end the loop, otherwise, return to step 1. 
























The individual base learners 𝐵𝑙, 𝑙 =  1, . . . , 𝐿, are mappings ℝ
𝑑  →  {0, 1}, where 
0 stands for cover and 1 for stego. Even though the performance of individual base learners 
can be weak, the accuracy quickly improves after fusion and eventually levels out for a 
sufficiently large L. 
From the experiments in Kodovsky’s paper, they show the ensemble is especially 
useful for fast feature development when attacking a new scheme. Ensemble classifiers 
offer accuracy comparable and often even better than the much more complex SVMs at a 
fraction of the computational cost. 
 
4.3 High-order Local Pattern 
A good object representation or object descriptor is one of the key issues for a well. The 
writers propose a novel object descriptor, the high order Local Derivative Pattern (LDP), 
for robust face recognition. The nth LDP is proposed to encode the (n-1)th-order local 






4.3.1 Local Binary Pattern 
Derived from a general definition of texture in a local neighborhood, LBP is defined as a 
grayscale invariant texture measure and is a useful tool to model texture images. 





Figure. 4.7 shows an example of obtaining an LBP micro-pattern when the threshold 
is set to zero. 
 
Figure 4.7 Example of obtaining the LBP micro-pattern for the region. 
4.3.2 Local Ternary Patterns 
Local binary pattern is a 2-valued (binary) code that is successfully used in many 
applications .The LBP operator idea is based on just two bit values either 1 or 0. This basis 
does not allow the LBP operator to discriminate between multiple patterns. The LBP 
operator has two main points of weakness [13]: 
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1) The LBP operator cannot distinguish between two pixel values if the first one 
is near the central pixel but a little bit below that pixel and the second 
undistinguishable one is far below the center pixel value. 
2) In flat image areas, such as in face images, where all pixels nearly have the 
same gray value, if a slight amount of noise were added to these areas the LBP 
operator will give some bits the value 0 and others the value 1. So the LBP 
feature will be unstable and thus the LBP operator will not be suitable for 
analyzing these areas. 
To solve these problems a new 3-valued texture operator, Local Ternary Patterns 
(LTP), that can be considered as an extension to LBP, was introduced recently. 
Instead of a thresholding that is based only on the central pixel value of the 
neighborhood, the user will define a threshold say t and any pixel value within the interval 
of – 𝑡 and +𝑡, thus assigns the value 0 to that pixel, while the user assigns the value 1 to 
that pixel if it is above this threshold and a value -1 if it is below it when compared to the 
central pixel value. 
 
𝐿𝑇𝑃(𝑖) = {
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑝𝑖 − 𝑝𝑐 ≥ 𝑡
0 𝑖𝑓 | 𝑝𝑖 − 𝑝𝑐| < 𝑡




where 𝑡 is a user specified threshold, 𝑝𝑖 is a pixel value in the neighborhood and 𝑝𝑐 is 
the central pixel value. 
Figure 4.8 shows an example of how the LTP operator works by using a threshold 






38 44 60  -1 0 1 
42 46 63  0  1 
32 56 40  -1 1 -1 
Figure 4.8 LTP Computation. 
 
To get rid of the negative values in Figure 4.8, the LTP values are divided into two 
LBP channels, the upper LTP (LTPU) and the lower LTP (LTPL) as in Figure 4.9. The 
LTPU is obtained by replacing the negative values in the original LTP by zeros. The LTPL 
is obtained in two steps: first, we replaced all the value of 1’s in the original LTP to be 
zeros then we changed the negative values to be 1’s. 
 




4.3.3 Local Derivative Pattern 







′ (𝑍2)), … , 𝑓(𝐼𝛼
′ (𝑍0), 𝐼𝛼
′ (𝑍8))} (4.9) 
 
It encodes the co-occurrence of two derivative directions at different neighboring 




′ (𝑍𝑖)) = {
0 𝑖𝑓 𝐼𝛼
′ (𝑍𝑖) ∙ 𝐼𝛼
′ (𝑍0) > 0
1 𝑖𝑓 𝐼𝛼
′ (𝑍𝑖) ∙ 𝐼𝛼
′ (𝑍0) ≤ 0
 (4.10) 
 
𝑖 = 1,2, … , 8. The second-order Local Derivative Pattern is defined as the concatenation 
of the four 8-bit directional LDPs. 
 
𝐿𝐷𝑃2(𝑍) = {𝐿𝐷𝑃𝛼
2(𝑍)|𝛼 = 0°, 45°, 90°, 135°} (4.11) 
 
The derivative direction comparisons defined in Figure 4.10 are performed on 16 
templates reflecting various distinctive spatial relationships in a local region. An example 





Figure 4.10 Example to obtain the second-order LDP micro-patterns. 
 
Source: Baochang Zhang, Yongsheng Gao, Sanqiang Zhao, Jianzhuang Liu, “Local Derivative Pattern 
Versus Local Binary Pattern: Face Recognition With High-Order,” IEEE Transactions on Image Processing, 




Figure 4.11 Illustration of LDP templates. 
 
Source: Baochang Zhang, Yongsheng Gao, Sanqiang Zhao, Jianzhuang Liu, “Local Derivative Pattern 
Versus Local Binary Pattern: Face Recognition With High-Order,” IEEE Transactions on Image Processing, 
VOL. 19, NO. 2, February 2010. 
 
4.3.4 Experiments 
A thorough system performance investigation, which covers various conditions of 
face recognition including lighting, accessory, pose, expression and aging variations, has 
been conducted. The comparative experiments between LDP and LBP were first conducted 
on the FERET face database, which is widely used to evaluate face recognition algorithms. 
Experimental results in Figure 4.12 demonstrate that the recognition accuracy in 
average is significantly improved when the order of local pattern is increased from the first-
order LBP to the second-order and the third-order LDPs. While illustrating this the third-






Figure 4.12 Results on the gray-level images 
 
The average recognition rates on the four probe sets against different Gaussian 
noise are illustrated in Figure 4.12, showing that LDP maintains a 13.7% to 15.0% higher 
accuracy over LBP 
This work investigates the feasibility and effectiveness of using high-order local 
pattern for face description and recognition. A Local Derivative Pattern (LDP) is proposed 
to capture the high-order local derivative variations. To model the distribution of LDP 
micro-patterns, an ensemble of spatial histograms is extracted as the representation of the 
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We construct Shi et al.’s experiment [3] in MATLAB to steganalyze HUGO at 0.4 bpp on 
BOSSbase 0.92 which is different from the database in Shi’s paper. Hence the result may 
be different from the accuracy in Shi’s paper. Table 4.4 shows accuracies of each feature 
type by ensemble classifier [18]. 
 
Table 4.4  The result by reconstructed LBP, LTP and LDP 
Feature Set LBP LTP LDP 
Whole 83.00% 83.21% 82.63% 
Pes 74.41% 75.32% 73.63% 
VARpe 68.61% 69.33% 68.56% 
MEDpe 67.49% 66.45% 67.91% 
LMbased 81.61% 82.31% 82.00% 
MN13 82.01% 83.68% 80.19% 
CL12 78.58% 80.00% 80.43% 
 
where Feature Sets represent residual images. Pes means successive prediction error 
images and VARpe corresponds variance of Pes; MEDpe is median-filter-based prediction 
error; LMbased corresponds residual images based on Law’s Masks; MN13 is high-pass 
filters based on Markov neighborhoods and CL12 is cliques filters. 
Because of the updated database and different parameters, we can see the result in 
LBP is a little different from the Shi et al.’s paper. Even though the error is acceptable 
(lower than 1%).  
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LDP, which is very useful in texture detection and face detection, is imported to 
steganalysis in this thesis. Ironically, LDP does not work better than LBP as we thought 
but the result is very similar to LBP’s. Meanwhile, feature sets point out that the LDP and 
LTP in complex filters bring higher accuracy compared with some simple mask like 
variance filter and medium filter. This is we didn't modify those filters for residuals images, 
which are suitable for LBP. Therefore, all results displayed above are very similar to LBP’s. 
We cannot create some new useful filters for LTP and LDP because of lack of time. 
Theoretically, LDP is a directional pattern, and we choose only two direction in this thesis. 
In that case, some images will perform better, while some perform terribly. The output is 
not always stable, which makes a great influence to the results. 






In this thesis, we have studied and given an overview of quite some number of steganalytic 
techniques for digital images. The techniques are broadly classified as specific and 
universal steganalysis. Universal statistical steganalysis are more robust as they are 
designed to detect messages embedded using any steganographic technique and without 
the knowledge of embedding technique. Specific detection method may be able to detect 
some specific steganographic scheme with a high detection accuracy, but with the 
development of Steganalysis, we can see that the accuracy of universal steganalysis is 
increasing and sometimes even higher than specific algorithm.  
Furthermore, we reconstruct the texture feature for steganalysis and replace the 
LBP by using LDP and LTP. Even though the improvement in steganalytic capability is 
not as large as expected, but the result is still comparable, which means texture feature 
works in steganalysis. In 2015, it is reported that some researchers used deep learning in 
steganalysis which has never been used in this area before. Although the performance in 
steganalysis achieved by the initial trial in using deep learning technology has not met the 
expectation, it is expected it may be novel approach for steganalysis. It will be an active 
future research for steganalysis. Unfortunately, the performance has not met our 
expectation compared with rich models. The accuracy is about 4% lower than SRM’s. 
It is clear that the development for steganalysis and steganography will continue to 
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